Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Beesley v. Hatch : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Standford Nielson; Attorney for Appellants.
Michael A. Day; Barbara G. Hjelle; Ronald W. Thompson; Thompson, Hughes, & Reber; Attorneys
for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Beesley v. Hatch, No. 910298.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3602

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

cmicr

^lOZ-f

TN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

CLAY TO BEESLEY and LaJUANA
BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DELL RANSOM HATCH, DELL F.
HATCH, JOAN HATCH, JODEL
VENTURES TRUST, ENCINOSA
ENTERPRISES, BERNICE LEHMAN
and COREY S. MOGELBERG and
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Appeal No. 910298
Defendants, Cross-Defendants,
and Appellants,
and,
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Defendant, Cross Claimant
and Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES

Argument Priority Classification (16) Utah R. App. P. 29

STANFORD NIELSON
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

MICHAEL A. DAY
BARBARA G. HJELLE
RONALD W. THOMPSON
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REJBER
148 East Tabernacle
c
St. George, Utah 84770

r?

• • • ' f c - 2 iy
Ci F $ t f W'i irjr r

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
CLAY TO BEESLEY and LaJUANA
BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,

)
]

X7

V •

t

DELL RANSOM HATCH, DELL F.
HATCH, JOAN HATCH, JODEL
VENTURES TRUST, ENCINOSA
ENTERPRISES, BERNICE LEHMAN
and COREY S. MOGELBERG and
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,

)
)

REPLY BRIEF OP APPELLANT

]
\

Defendants,

WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Counterc1a imant,
v.
CLAY T. BEESLEY and LaJUANA
BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Crossclaimant, and Appellee,
v.
JODEL VENTURES TRUST, DELL F.
HATCH, Trustee, COREY S.
MOGELBERG, BERNICE LEHMAN
ENCINOSA ENTERPRISES, DELL
HATCH, TRUSTEE, DELL RANSOM
HATCH and DEE SUPPLY, INC.

i

Appeal No. 910298

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Constitution. Statutes, and Court Rules
Section 78-37-1

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) . . .

Section 78-37-1

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) . . .

Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure .
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Cases
Brooks v. Department of Emp. Sec, 736 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1987) .
Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 236 P.2d 343 (Utah 1951).
Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co, v. Atkin, Wright, and Miles .
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)
Murray City v. Hall

663 P.2d 1314, (Utah 1983)

ii

ARGUMENT
I
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NOT
TREATED AS A SINGLE PARCEL BY THE PARTIES
The first argument proposed by Appellee Spendlove suggests
that the property in question was treated as one parcel by the
parties and as such was not subject to sale as multiple parcels
pursuant to the holding of Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 23 6
P.2d. 343 (Utah 1951).

Appellants, (collectively referred to as

Hatch) contend that the property was not treated as one parcel and
that Commercial is distinguishable from the case before the court.
Spendlove argues that his "one parcel" position is evidenced
by the fact that the parcel was always described in the various
deeds as one legal description.

However, Hatch would contend that

often large parcels of property are described as one parcel for
purposes of convenience. For example, if a parcel of land had been
divided into 500 lots it would not be expected that a deed
transferring title would contain 500 separate legal descriptions.
A party would be more likely to provide a legal description
covering the outside boundary of the property.

Accordingly, the

fact that the property was only described as one parcel in the
various deeds is not necessarily indicative of the number of
parcels contained within the property.
In addition, the facts of the case indicate that the property
was treated as more than one parcel by both parties.

The " Second

Amendment To The Trust Deed Note and Escrow Agreement" executed

February 15, 1985 (Rec I at 22) indicates that "Hatch shall be
entitled to a partial release of 2 acres for every $12,000 of
principal which is reduced against the initial principal sum . . .".
A similar provision is found in the " Third Amendment To Trust Deed
Note And Escrow Agreement" (Rec I at 106) executed on April 29,
1986.

In that agreement the trustee is empowered to release

portions

of the encumbered

property

from the effect of the

Agreement and Note, in two acre increments...".

In addition,

paragraphs 4, 5, & 6 of said agreement acknowledges that third
party purchasers of the smaller parcels may make payments directly
to Spendlove.

The only purpose of this document is to provide a

means by which two acre parcels may be released from the original
trust deed.

Clearly, Spendlove was not treating the property as

one parcel when he executed these agreements.
In addition, the fact that Spendlove names subsequent owners
as defendants to this action is further indication that Spendlove
knew that the property had been divided into several lots.
Finally, the county records reflect that the property had been
divided in to several parcels.

The plat map for the Washington

Counts Tax Assessor (Rec II at 3 02) reveals that the property had
been divided into smaller parcels and acknowledged that each of the
defendants held an interest in one of the lots.

Hatch contends

that the property was therefore known to consist of several parcels
and as such should have been sold pursuant to the direction of the
judgement debtor.
Based upon the foregoing evidence Spendlove should not have
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been allowed to change his position

and assert that the property

was one parcel of land, at the Sherifffs sale.
II
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE PROVIDE
A REASONABLE MEANS OF RECONCILING
THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN
SECTION 78-37-6 AND RULE 69
The second and third arguments presented in Spendlove1s brief
recognizes the apparent conflict between Section 78-37-6 Utah Code
Annotated (empowering the courts to determine the parcels and order
of sale) and Section 78-37-1 Utah Code Annotated and Rule 69, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (empowering the judgment debtor to direct
the order of sale).

Spendlove urges that the authority given to

the courts overrides the authority given to the judgment debtor.
This position, however, is not supported by any authority or
precedent.

As a rule of law, when statutes are in apparent

conflict, every effort should be made to interpret the statutes in
harmony with each other. Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, (Utah
1983) .
Hatch contends that this court should attempt to harmonize the two
statutes in question rather than support one statute and disregard
the other.

While a potential for conflict between the statutes

may in theory exist, the facts of this case allow the court to
harmonize the respective statutes.
Spendlove contends that the court ordered the property in
question to be sold as a single parcel.
case.

However, this is not the

A careful review of the Order of Sale (Rec II at 23 6)

reveals that the court made no specific order regarding the

existence of parcels or the order of their sale.

The court simply

stated that the Sheriff of Washington County should "sell the
premises described in said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure ....
and you shall do all things according to the terms and requirements
of said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, and the applicable
provisions and requirements of law".
The court did not expressly find that the property consisted
of one parcel.

In fact the court did not make any finding at all

regarding

number

the

of

parcels

found

within

the

described

property, instead it issued a general order to sell the property in
question.

Hatch contends that when the court fails to exercise

it's authority

to determine the parcels and

order

of sale,

pursuant to Section 78-37-6, the judgment debtor should be free to
make such a determination at the sale pursuant to Rule 69 and
Section 78-37-1.
This approach provides a means of harmonizing the conflicting
provisions of the law and does little violence to either statute.
By comparison, if we adopt the position suggested by Spendlove,
(i.e. that the general language contained in this Order constitutes
a direction to sell as one parcel) then the court, in effect,
rescinds the rights granted to judgment debtors since all mortgage
sales originate with am initial court order directing the sale of
property.
Ill
THE SHERIFF'S SALE WAS UNFAIR
AND RESULTED IN INJURY TO APPELLANTS
Argument IV of Spendlovefs brief argues that Hatch must show
that the result of a sale was unfair in order to justify setting

aside the Sheriff's Sale, Appellants have addressed the issues of
unfairness and the way that the sale, as conducted, interferes with
Appellants right to redeem the property, in their opening brief.
Spendlove has presented a dissertation of the law but has not
refuted the appellants position that their redemption rights were
restricted by selling the property as one parcel.

Accordingly,

since the parties seem to be in agreement on this issue appellants
position will not be argued further. See, Rule 24(c) Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

IV
THE PROCEDURAL DEFECTS OF APPELLANTS
IF ANY, DO NOT JUSTIFY DISMISSAL OF
THIS CASE
Appellee next asserts that this appeal should be dismissed for
several procedural reasons.
First, Spendlove contends that the case should be dismissed
for failure of Hatch to file a cost bond.

However, Failure to

file a cost bond is not jurisdictional Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Atkin, Wright, and Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

In

addition, this court has held that a court has discretion to allow
the filing of a cost bond where no prejudice is shown to the
respondent,

Mountain States at 2 64. Spendlove has not raised any

objection to the failure to file a cost bond until the filing of
his brief nearly one year after this appeal was filed.

More

importantly he has not shown that he has been prejudiced in any
way.

Appellants stand willing and able to provide the cost bond

at the courts direction and would ask permission to file the bond

if the court deems the same to be necessary,
Spendlove next argues that the appeal should be dismissed as
a result of Appellants failure to request a transcript. No record
has been transcribed because their is virtually no record to
transcribe.

In this case, there was no trial on the merits. The

case was resolved by stipulation.

The only record, of any

substance, would be a record of the hearing on the Motion to Set
Aside the Sheriff's Sale, however, none of the testimony presented
at that hearing

is being

contested.

Further

the arguments

presented orally are virtually identical to those presented in
writing and contained in the court record.

Appellants are not

seeking a determination based upon any testimony or the courts
ruling as to the admissability of evidence.

Appellants are not

contesting any finding entered by the court.

The only issues

addressed in this appeal relate to the application of law to the
facts and the lack of specific Findings of Fact.

None of the

issues raised on appeal are assisted by transcription of the very
limited record in this case.
Spendlove

further

contends

that

without

a

transcript

Appellants have not met their burden of showing that the trial
court erred in its denial of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside
Sheriff's Sale "particularly as it relates to the trial court's
factual

finding

that

the

Sheriff's

Sale was

fair

and

non-

prejudicial to Appellants..." Brief of Appellee, p. 16, (underline
added).

However, Appellee can not cite to signed order wherein

the court signed any order finding that the sale was fair.

The

transcript of court's ruling from the bench, does not help resolve

the issues on appeal since the ruling does not have effect until
reduced to writing, executed by the

judge and entered in the

records of the court.
This same argument applies to Spendlove1s argument that Hatch
failed to "marshal the evidence".

A marshaling of the evidence is

only necessary when a party is contending that the court weighed
the evidence incorrectly making its findings. In this case, Hatch
contends that the court either failed to make findings completely
or incorrectly applied the law to the findings.
Spendlove next complaint that Appellants docketing statement
was not timely filed.

However, Appellants failure to timely file

the docketing statement did not adversely affect the Appellee and
did not defeat the purpose of the docketing statement as set forth
in Rule 9 (b) .

Once again Spendlove makes no objection until

several months after the statement has been filed and accepted by
the court.

It would be unfair to allow Appellants to incur the

considerable expense of briefing this case and then dismiss the
same based upon an event to which their was never any objection.
Appellants contend that Spendlovefs objection to the docketing
statement is untimely.

Finally, the case of Brooks v. Department

of Emp. Sec. 736 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1987) is not applicable to the
facts at hand. In Brooks the docketing statement was substantively
deficient, lacking much of the required information.
the statement was not deficient in any respect.

In this case

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments in conjunction with those
found in Appellants opening brief, Appellants request that this
court sustain this appeal.
Dated this 1st day of April, 1992.

**££"St^rrJorH NielSon.
:torney fox/ Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify, that on the 1st day of April, 1992, I mailed four
true and correct copies of the REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to:
Ronald W. Thompson
Michael A. Day
Thompson, Hughes & Reber
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770

